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Abstract 
This paper introduces the concept of ‘skeomorphic reassurance’ as a guiding 
principle for human interfaces in technological development and design, particularly 
for older people and people with dementia (PwD).   Skeuomorphs exhibit decorative 
design elements reminiscent of ‘parent’ objects that incorporated such design 
elements because they were structurally integral. Human interfaces adopted by new 
technologies need to be carefully balanced between novelty and recognisability. 
 
The philosophy of personhood is discussed in the context of dementia, concluding 
that the subjective character of conscious mental processes is an irreducible feature 
of reality, and that the persistence of personhood in PwD constitutes a further 
argument in support of this assertion. 
 
Assistive technologies that aid family and carers, as well as PwD, and their 
relationships, need to ensure that skeuomorphic reassurance is incorporated in their 
design, not least because older people and PwD need recognisable interfaces today, 
but, as this paper argues, because the problems today’s over-65s have with digital 
technologies may quite likely not go away, but re-present themselves generation 
after generation, unless skeuomorphic reassurance is built into their design. 
Introduction 
This paper aims to promote the concept of ‘skeuomorphic reassurance’ as a guiding 
principle for human interfaces in technological development and design.  It does so 
set in the context of a number of developments in the contemporary social 
landscape: (i) an ageing world population, (ii) the persistence of personhood amidst 
the occurrence of dementia in otherwise physically healthy older people, (iii) the 
accelerating rapidity of technological development, (iv) the importance of combating 
digital exclusion of the elderly as an on-going, and not merely a one-off imperative. 
We shall address each of these issues in turn.  This constitutes, of necessity, a 
position paper, rather than one presenting results of research, laying out the 
conceptual background behind a planned research programme aimed at discovering 
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what the guiding principles – and associated techniques – of skeuomorphic 
reassurance might be.  
 
A skeuomorph is any object that exhibits decorative design elements reminiscent of 
‘parent’ or antecedent objects that incorporated such design elements because they 
were structurally integral.  The moulded stitching on a plastic jacket recalling the 
actual stitching on a leather one is a good example, because it also includes both the 
implied technological advance – from traditional materials to modern materials – and 
the implied ‘retro’ chic that makes the old materials, and the old ways of making 
jackets, seem somehow more attractive than the new, which need no stitching at 
all.  Increasingly, the old materials alluded to in skeuomorphs, are simply no longer in 
use – or only in expensive artisan shops –but the aesthetic nonetheless remains. In 
the context of digital interfaces, such skeuomorphs are everywhere, from the floppy 
disk icon one clicks upon to ‘save,’ to the Super-8 film reel icon one clicks upon to 
shoot digital video. 
 
The key concept of this paper – skeuomorphic reassurance - is built upon the 
knowledge already embedded in much technological design that the human interface 
adopted by new technologies needs to be carefully balanced between novelty and 
recognisability.  
 
For older people with neurocognitive disorders, for whom long term memory often 
remains intact significantly longer than short term memory, the use of skeuomorphs 
promises a more meaningful and memorable means of engaging with, in particular, 
innovative technologies which aim to augment disease-related declines in 
cognition.  What we bring to this is the assertion that this balance is inevitably a 
moving target: the digital exclusion of the elderly is not a one-off problem that will be 
overcome once those currently over 65 have all passed away.  Those who are 
today’s tech-savvy twenty-something digital natives - who may have never seen a 
floppy disk let alone a Super-8 camera - will in forty years’ time be faced with the 
self-same problems as today’s elderly population, unless inclusive design principles 
are embedded into the education of technologists and interface developers by the 
educators of today. 
The Philosophy of Personhood and Dementia 
According to the UN’s 2013 report on World Population Ageing, “The global share of 
older people (aged 60 years or over) increased from 9.2 per cent in 1990 to 11.7 per 
cent in 2013 and will continue to grow as a proportion of the world population, 
reaching 21.1 per cent by 2050.” (United Nations 2013) These are big numbers, and 
the coming ‘second machine age’ of automation and robotics promises a host of 
technological solutions for the care and social engagement of the elderly. (Sixsmith 
and Gutman 2013; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Begum et. al. 2015; van 
Wynsberghe 2013; van Wynsberghe 2015) 
 
Health and welfare are an extremely important part of the wider economy, and many 
technologists will make their living from providing technologies specifically to meet 
the needs of older people.   Being economically productive is not restricted to being 
part of the working population.  Whole new markets are already opening up catering 
for the interests and activities of the growing population of economically active 
individuals who are no longer in work, but whose (pension and asset-based) incomes 
are still being spent.   The focus for the authors of this paper is one very special 
feature of ageing: the phenomenon of neurocognitive disorders, particularly dementia 
and its precursors, such as mild cognitive impairment (MCI). 
 
Defined loosely as a disorder of the mental processes marked by problems with 
memory, personality changes, and impaired reasoning, dementia is a spectrum, 
described as “a set of symptoms that may include memory loss and difficulties with 
thinking, problem-solving or language.” (Alzheimer’s Society 2016)  
 
A common misconception of dementia – that as the mental processes gradually 
collapse an individual’s ‘personhood’ also vanishes – has long been challenged in 
the medical literature (Jenkins & Price, 1996; Tapen et al 1999; Kontos 2005; 
O’Connor et al 2007; Fazio et al. 2009; McCormack et al 2012; Palmer, 2013; Hunter 
et al., 2013; Kaufmann & Engel, 2014;). Others challenge the stigma against older 
people even more broadly, at the same time welcoming the deconstruction of 
‘senility’, in the 70s and 80s, as a treatable disease (Alzheimer’s as the most 
common among many) and yet pointing out how the public information campaigns 
concerning Alzheimer’s have heightened, not lessened, the stigma, through 
generating even more fear than the less-well defined condition of senility ever did 
(Ballenger 2006). 
 
The stigma translates all too often, moreover, into poor care.  There are numerous 
examples in the literature of unsafe, dehumanizing and disrespectful behaviour 
toward people with dementia (PwD), which deny personhood (Bernoth et al 2014; 
Palmer 2013). For instance, Palmer (2013, p. 226): 
They had a habit for a while of taking off her diaper and pulling down her pants and 
leaving them around her ankles [at nap time] and it bothered me. One time when I 
happened to be there when she was waking up from her nap, she was just squirming 
and moving all over that bed and frowning. I kept saying, “Mom, what’s wrong?” 
“Nothing”. “Does something hurt?” “No.”. I finally figured out that she’s trying to move 
her legs and can’t. Who of us would lay down for a nap and pull our pants down 
around our ankles and leave them there? None of us.  
 
We would argue that the view that personhood vanishes as dementia increases 
relies upon a philosophical definition of personhood that has itself been robustly 
challenged.  The challenge is taking place on several fronts, but of most interest to 
this discussion are the arguments in political philosophy, in the biological and 
mechanical understanding of life, and in the philosophy of personhood. 
 
Much political philosophy rests upon a renaissance understanding of the ‘rational 
man’ of Descartes (1641), who with Locke’s (1690) rights of accumulation of 
unowned resources, Rousseau’s social contract (1762), and Kant’s morals (1785), 
establishes himself in the liberal world.  Even Rawls’ more contemporary notions of 
social justice rest upon this same foundation (1971). This definition of the human has 
come in for a good deal of criticism in recent years – not least from feminists (e.g. 
Pateman 1988; Okin 1989; and Nussbaum 2013) – for its depiction of personhood in 
terms suited to a (male) capitalist political settlement concerned with protecting itself 
from royal and aristocratic appropriation (MacPherson 1951; 1962; Farr 2007).  It 
may have been useful in the 17th and 18th centuries, it is argued, but is today 
responsible for creating its own new aristocracies of billionaires at the top of a very 
unequal society (Kreps 2011). 
 
Similarly, there is renewed distrust in the ‘rational’ man’s more contemporary 
depiction of the human as biological automaton.   Wiener’s cybernetic understanding 
of life in terms of feedback processes (Wiener 1946), was challenged by the second-
order cyberneticists of the decades following his work (Beer 1959; von Foerster 
1974; Pask 1975; Maturana and Varela 1987) for whom the observer became 
integral, and has been largely debunked by the complexity theorists in contemporary 
evolutionary biology (Botkin 1992; Goodwin 1994; Kauffman 1995; Kreps 2015), for 
whom life is a spontaneous self-organised order at the edge of chaotic network 
dynamics.  
 
Thought experiments in the philosophy of personhood, meanwhile, such as 
Parfit’s  (1971), have suggested that ‘persons’ might be surgically transferable in 
half-brain portions between different bodies, if only we were to understand such 
personhood as mere eliminable epiphenomena, dancing flame-like upon the ‘real’ 
activity of synaptic electrochemical pulsations.   All that makes us human, for such 
‘eliminativists’, is mere illusion, an insubstantial froth upon the reality of biochemical 
predetermination.  To Churchland and his followers, “our common-sense conceptual 
framework for mental phenomena” (Churchland 1981:68) should be seen as a tacit 
theory that we absorb in childhood and make use of every day.  This is to suggest 
that mental-state terms, (‘I feel happy’, ‘I want to dance’ etc.) in short, are theoretical 
terms.  This folk psychology ‘theory,’ for Churchland, - known as FP - is both tacit 
and empirical - we don’t think about it, and it is neurological in origin.  In its harshest 
form - ‘eliminative materialism’ - FP is, however, regarded as a seriously mistaken 
theory – a “degenerating research programme” in Lakatos’ terms (Churchland 
1981:75).  We have rested upon its tacit use for millennia without it seeming to 
progress. Churchland argues, moreover, that the posits of seriously mistaken 
theories – such as Stahl’s phlogiston (Churchland 1981:81) for example - do not 
exist.  His conclusion, therefore, is that mental-state terms refer to things that do not 
exist, or in other words, that mental-states do not exist.   Folk psychology, for 
Churchland, will eventually be “displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by 
completed neuroscience” (Churchland 1981:67). 
 
Here we are at the fulcrum of the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists 
- the stand-off between free will, for which read mental-states that have meaning in 
the world, and determinism, for which read scientific materialism.  Free will may be 
compatible with determinism, in which case all is determined only up to a point, or 
incompatible with it, in which case either nothing is determined, or there is no free 
will.  Without going too far into the debate, the authors suggest that the evidence of 
personhood amongst dementia sufferers may have an important impact upon its 
outcome.  For Parfit, and, by extension, for some of the eliminativists, ‘memories,’ 
once re-imagined as ‘q-memories’ - simple neural firings and synaptic chemical 
exchanges - could be transferable, and thus personhood transplantable, and if these 
neurobiological processes deteriorate, personhood vanishes.  This acknowledges 
what is known as the ‘supervenience’ of physical science, from the dynamic forces of 
mechanistic physical properties all the way up.  In contrast to this supervenience 
stand three other possibilities: (i) that of emergent properties, faculties that come 
about where the whole is greater than the sum of (in this case neurochemical) 
component parts; (ii) panpsychism, wherein such faculties as subjective 
consciousness are apparent everywhere, in everything, only to varying degrees; and 
(iii) the possibility that the ‘supervenience’ of physical science is a veil covering 
science’s ignorance of the processes of subjectivity, which are – must be – as real as 
any others, but for which the sciences of our day are as yet inadequate to the task of 
understanding.  For all these views opposed to supervenience, memories could 
never be ever anything other than ‘my’ memories.   
 
Nagel (1986), and other philosophers, have supported the subjective character of 
conscious mental processes; as he says: “The subjectivity of consciousness is an 
irreducible feature of reality – without which we couldn’t do physics or anything else – 
and it must occupy as fundamental a place in any credible world view as matter, 
energy, space, time and numbers.” (1986:7-8). This view, the authors argue, is 
compatible with the notion of the emergence of such a faculty, and could equally well 
be situated within what Skrbina (2007) would describe as a ‘panpsychist’ 
understanding of consciousness, but is perhaps closest to the processual view of 
Whitehead (1978), for whom our concept of nature – originating in Descartes’ 
division of mind and body – is what needs to be healed.  Bergson (1946), whom 
Whitehead acknowledged as a major influence, was perhaps a supporter of both 
emergence and panpsychism, and seemed to suggest our intellectual faculties could 
not – by definition – appreciate the nature of the subjective, which is more properly 
the domain of our intuition (Kreps 2015).  The fundamental reality of the subjective, 
which biological science and a 20th century philosophical tradition wedded to physics 
seem intent on denying has any existence, nonetheless, as well as finding support in 
the philosophical approaches of emergence, panpsychism, and process studies, 
perhaps also finds support in the real-life experiences of those suffering from 
dementia, and their carers.  
 
For example, in dementia studies, Kitwood (2013) and those that followed him have 
seen personhood in relational terms. That is, there is not only the individualistic view 
of personhood prevalent in western philosophy, outlined above, but an understanding 
that for millennia has been evident in other cultures of the value of community (e.g. 
Tschaepe 2013). The interpersonal, relational, social aspects of personhood are 
seen to continue, even as the neurological disorder worsens. This is why with 
‘person centred’ care, nursing staff are encouraged to relate to the person with 
dementia as they are now, whilst using photos and objects of that person’s past to 
make relational connections between that nurse and the older person (Jenkins 1996; 
Touhy 2004; McCormack et al 2012; Hunter et al 2013; Kaufmann and Engel 2014). 
Such physical props as are in current use by professional caregivers of PwD can be 
adapted into forms of skeuomorophic reassurance, for new assistive technology 
devices (ATD) that augment rationality. 
 
The philosophy of personhood, in sum, is a debate, and not a consensus. For all the 
importance and usefulness of the biological and medical sciences in maintaining our 
physical health, our mental health and the subjective reality of our selfhoods remain 
beyond the understanding – because it is outside the constraints that define what 
they mean by ‘understanding’ (Stengers 2011) - of even the most accomplished of 
neuroscientists.  Our detailed knowledge of the behaviour of synapses, and, indeed, 
of the deterioration of the brain in diseases such as Alzheimer’s, still does not even 
begin to approach an understanding of who we are, or how it is we come to be who 
we are, because our sciences persist in a “bifurcation of nature into two systems of 
reality” (Whitehead 1964).   Nor do we know how it is, even when the biological 
functioning of the brain is coming to a close, that we still are who we are – even if 
only in flashes through the clouds of confusion that gather in our minds. Such 
episodes of lucidity – even in quite late stage dementia – and the evidence within the 
relationships between those with dementia and their carers, strongly suggest that “in 
dementia personhood can be understood as increasingly concealed rather than lost.” 
(Smedbye and Kirkevold 2013). One may, indeed, conclude that the ‘individual 
rational man’ approach to understanding personhood, with its unpalatable political 
ramifications and the resulting rather nonsensical arguments of the eliminativists, is 
being superseded by the evidence supporting Nagel’s assertion of the irreducibly 
subjective character of personhood, and that a ‘general’ (in Whitehead’s sense of the 
word) understanding of the nature of Nature – our perception of it combined with, 
rather than merely added to the constituents of it – may finally be approaching 
fruition. 
Towards a Principle of Built-in Skeuomorphic Reassurance 
Although in recent years Kitwood’s (1997) attempts at defining personhood for 
dementia have received attention (Hunter et al., 2013; Kaufmann & Engel, 2014), 
little has so far been developed that examines the connection of personhood to the 
role of assistive technology (Alzheimer Europe, 2010). ATD have been used 
extensively for PwD, from home sensors, to lifting devices (Alzheimer Europe, 2010), 
to telehealth (Pakrasi et al 2015) and much more. Increasingly artificial intelligence 
(AI) ATD are augmenting memory, spatial and temporal orientation, and providing 
other forms of cognitive assistance (Teipel et al). Thus the concealment of 
personhood for PwD is being increasingly overcome. 
 
The rapidity of such technological advance since the 1970s has not only been 
striking, but continues to accelerate.  The so-called Great Acceleration (Steffen et. al. 
2015) of the Anthropocene has produced effects such as Moore’s Law that have 
helped to radically transform our societies and our expectations.  Most older - and 
many younger - people have problems working with and accessing digital 
technologies, however, due to issues of accessibility, pricing, and the ever changing 
functionality of the devices available, and the software that runs on them (Burmeister 
2010, 2012). Although it was thought that more serious health conditions would 
impact these difficulties more negatively, the reality is proving far more nuanced. As 
the costs of catering to an ageing population escalate, governments around the world 
are looking to technology to reduce the costs of institutionalisation. Frequently such 
technologies also serve, moreover, to enhance quality of life, by enabling people to 
live independently in their homes and communities for longer.   
 
Mobile technologies, and the connectivity they provide for all manner of devices, 
alongside GPS functionality for location-awareness, have encouraged a shift from 
the pathology of illness toward support for continued wellness in healthcare systems, 
using technology to help care workers provide their services to people in their own 
homes, when needed.   One of the most relevant of these developments, with 
respect to PwD, is a new field of technologies clustered around the notion of 
‘augmented rationality,’ including reminiscence games, reminders to take tablets, 
geofencing, smart homes, and so forth.  In simplest form, in an age where 
augmented reality permits people passing by a historic building to see it as it was in, 
say, the 1920s on their mobile device, ‘my’ memories – at least in photographic 
fascimile - can be stored and retrieved, such that it becomes possible to augment 
memories, and by extension, the rationality of PwD. 
 
One issue with all these new technologies that this paper wishes to highlight, is of the 
usability – the ‘user experience’ - of these new devices, the interfaces they offer, and 
the functionality of their software.  Issues of designing for the whole population have 
begun to rise to the forefront of people’s minds (Clarkson et al 2013), and it is to this 
debate that we wish to add the notion of skeuomorphic reassurance. The problems 
today’s over-65s have with digital technologies may quite likely not go away. The 
nature of those problems will change as technologies change, but those of us familiar 
with today’s technologies, as we grow older and join the over 65s, may likely find the 
new technologies coming onto the market difficult to engage with – let alone the likely 
impact of on-going convergence whereby technologies we are familiar with today 
become replaced by new functionalities of other technologies.  The assumption that 
because current generations will be familiar with technology, they will cope better 
when older is thus flawed - not only because technology is itself constantly changing 
- but because as Burmeister (2010) points out, it fails to account for an 
understanding of ageing, and the cognitive limitations that the ageing process brings 
to usability of technology. To avoid this problem, we believe, technology developers 
need to embed into their design processes a principle of skeuomorphic reassurance. 
This principle moreover, needs to be a ‘rolling’ one, that keeps skeuomorphs (like the 
film reel and floppy disk icons) for roughly 30-40 years, and drops them gradually as 
time goes by, and piecemeal rather than wholesale. 
 
Skeuomorph design needs to consider the particular needs of the user population. 
Not only does it need to be person focused, respecting their autonomy, recognising 
the limits imposed on such autonomy by their debilitating disease, but for PwD there 
are also further interfacing considerations. Research in socially assistive robots has 
revealed that most effective for PwD has proven to be natural speech (Begum et al., 
2015). However, that does not apply to all PwD because of four frequently occurring 
problems: long pauses or no response to questions, problems with word finding, 
confusion, and confabulation (the user provides non-factual information). As 
suggested above, in relation to adapting the skeuomorph design to the personal 
history of the PwD, so too the skeuomorph design needs to be adaptive. Flexibility in 
the mode of input may be required, given that the intentionality of some user 
behaviour will need to be selected based on the user’s remaining abilities. 
Skeuomorphs, moreover, should not only be dynamically adaptive to the user, but 
should lend themselves to interaction that does not require manual dexterity. That is, 
although the display might be visual, user interaction might involve speech or 
gestures. 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, we have considered (i) the ageing world population, (ii) the persistence 
of personhood amidst the occurrence of dementia in otherwise physically healthy 
older people, (iii) the accelerating rapidity of technological development, and (iv) the 
importance of combating digital exclusion of the elderly as an on-going, and not 
merely a one-off imperative. 
 
We have seen that “The subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible feature of 
reality” (Nagel 1986:7-8) and that personhood is concealed rather than reduced in 
the context of dementia, often at its most visible through the relationships with family 
and carers that persist even in later stages.  We have found, in particular, that the 
person-centred care model, which arose from consideration of the philosophy of 
personhood (Kitwood 1997), arguably takes its place among other robust challenges 
to the more traditional Western philosophical definitions of personhood discussed in 
this paper.  It has been applied in many areas, including that of dementia. Similarly, a 
special form of person centred care has been that of family centred care, which has 
focused on the care of young children who in many cases, due to their age related 
cognitive limitations, need family carers to make decisions for them. Arguably family 
centred care, with its roots in the philosophical consideration of personhood, could 
also be applied to the care of older people with neurocognitive disorders, such as 
dementia. This suggests new areas of exploration that have not previously been 
considered in the literature on personhood. 
 
The implications for design of ATD, and for policy makers, suggest much more 
collaborative approaches: right from the inclusion of subjectivity in the understanding 
of the nature of Nature, up through the applied sciences into the technologies of 
support our highly technologized societies are now capable of producing – on 
unprecedented scales – for the improvement of the welfare of the increasingly large 
segment of our societies over the age of retirement.  Technology companies need to 
expand their workforces to include social scientists as well as technicians, user 
experience specialists as well as coders.   
 
Most importantly, with the principle of skeuomorphic reassurance, the authors enjoin 
technologists to remember that the balance between novelty and recognisability is 
inevitably a moving target: the digital exclusion of the elderly is not a one-off problem 
that will be overcome once those currently over 65 have all passed away. 
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